MULTISTATE PRACTICE AND CONFLICTING
ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS
Duncan T. O'Brien*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Multistate or interstate practice of the law has become increasingly common in recent years.' The greater mobility of lawyers and clients, the interstate scope of many business and legal
transactions, the adoption of uniform acts and model codes, the
growth of specialized areas of legal practice, and the pervasiveness of Federal law have all contributed to this phenomenon.2
Another factor responsible for, or perhaps responding to, this
increase in multijurisdictional practice is the easing of residency
requirements for admission to the bar.3
Lawyers admitted to practice in more than one state are subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of each state to which they are
admitted.4 Similarly, an out-of-state attorney admitted pro hac
vice submits to the disciplinary system of the admitting state.5 In
addition, a lawyer not admitted in a state may have to conform
his conduct to that state's ethical code if he is engaged in sub6
stantial legal activity there.
Until recently, the fact that a lawyer might be subject to
more than one state's disciplinary standards was not a matter of
concern. First, few lawyers were involved in multijurisdictional
practice. Second, the standards of professional responsibility did
not differ significantly from state to state. From 1908 to 1969,
the American Bar Association (ABA) Canons of Ethics were the
* J.D., Harvard Law School 1985. Clerk, Honorable R. Lanier Anderson, III,
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The author would like to
thank Dean Daniel R. Coquellette of the Boston College Law School for his helpful

comments and suggestions.
I Brakel & Loh, Regulating the Multistate Practice of Law, 50 WASH. L. REV. 699,

699 (1975).
2 Id. at 699-700; see Note, RegulatingMultistate Law Firms, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1211,
1215-17 (1980); see also Leis v. Flynt, 439 U.S. 438, 449-50 (1979) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (discussing the metamorphosis of law practice).
3 See Supreme Court v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985) (rule excluding nonresidents from bar violates privileges and immunities clause).
4 See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY PROCEEDINGS
§ 4.1 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS].
5 See id. § 4.2.
6 See infra notes 178-195 and accompanying text.
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source of ethical standards in most jurisdictions.' In 1969, the
ABA House of Delegates unanimously approved the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility (Model Code).8 Three years later,
the Model Code "had been adopted by court rule or unified bar
resolution in nearly all states, usually with no more than minor
changes." 9 By 1977, forty-nine states had adopted the Model
Code,' 0 and the remaining state, California, had established a
very similar set of standards."
Subsequently, small discrepancies among state standards became apparent as the Model Code was amended by the ABA and
only some states adopted the changes.' 2 Rules relating to client
confidentiality, advertising, and solicitation displayed the most
significant differences.'" The Model Code was thus reconsidered
in the late 1970's to address, among other things, its "failure...
to consider the problem of conflicting standards" of ethics.' 4 The
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards then
drafted a new code-the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
(Model Rules). 5 In August of 1983, the ABA House of Delegates
approved the Model Rules as a replacement for the Model
7 See Gozansky, The Growing Significance of Professional Responsibility Considerations,
12 STETSON L. REV. 601, 603 (1983).
8 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL CODE]. The ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code in August,
1969 to become effective January 1, 1970. Association's House of Delegates Meets in
Dallas, August 11-13, 55 A.B.A.J. 970, 970 (1969).
9 Finman & Schneyer, The Role of BarAssociation Ethics Opinions in Regulating Lawyer Conduct: A Critique of the Work of the ABA Committee on Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibility, 29 UCLA L. REV. 67, 68 n.1 (1981) (citation omitted).
10 See generally STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
AM. BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1977) (comparing the Model Code to the professional standards adopted by 49 states).
I See CAL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1-100 to 8-101.
12 Moser, A Major Improvement, the Rules Should Be Adopted, 69 A.B.A.J. 867, 868
(1983). For example, Disciplinary Rule 7-102 states that "[a] lawyer who receives
information. . . that. . .[h]is client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the
fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a
privileged communication." MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-102(B)(1) (emphasis added). The italicized section, which was not included in the original version of the
rule, was adopted by amendment by the ABA in 1974. Moser, supra, at 868. The
amended version was "adopted in no more than four or five states." Id.
13 Winter, Model Discipline Rules: Franck Predicts Demise of Uniformity, 8 B. LEADER,
May-June 1983, at 4, 4-5.
14 Introduction to Symposium: Reflections on a Decade Under the Code of Professional Responsibility: The Need for Reform, 57 N.C.L. REV. 495, 495 (1979).
15 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
RULES].
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Code.' 6 The Model Rules differ substantially from the Model
Code in many areas. 17
Since approval of the Model Rules, ten states have adopted
new standards for professional conduct based on the Model
Rules.' 8 Consequently, there are currently two very different
standards in force in the United States-the Model Code and the
Model Rules. This situation will not change in the near future;
the approval procedure is moving slowly,' 9 and some state bar
associations have rejected the new rules.20
In addition, each state that has enacted a new code of conduct based on the Model Rules has modified them. 2 ' Such modification was encouraged by the head of the ABA Special
Committee on Implementation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, who stated, " 'You can shape these rules to your
See id. at 1.
See infra notes 25-117 and accompanying text.
To date, the following states have adopted codes based on the Model Rules:
Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Washington. See Arizona Adopts New Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 1 LAw. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA), 445, 445 (Oct. 3, 1984)
[hereinafter cited as LAw. MAN.]; Arkansas Adopts New Code Based on ABA Model Rules,
1 LAw. MAN., supra, at 1126, 1126 (Jan. 8, 1986); Delawareand Washington Adopt New
Ethics Rules, 1 LAw. MAN., supra, at 961, 961-62 (Sept. 18, 1985); Two More States
Adopt Versions of Model Rules, 1 LAw. MAN., supra, at 855, 855-56 (July 10, 1985) (Minnesota and Montana); Missouri Adopts New Code Based on ABA Model Rules, 1 LAw.
MAN., supra, at 924, 924 (Aug. 21, 1985); Nevada Adopts Model Rules; Bars Elsewhere
Issue Reports, 2 LAw. MAN., supra, at 37, 37 (Feb. 19, 1986); Model Rules Adopted in
N.H., Advance in Two Other States, 1 LAw. MAN., supra, at 1142, 1142 (Jan. 22, 1986);
New Jersey Adopts New Code Based on Model Rules, 1 LAw. MAN., supra, at 334, 334-35
(July 25, 1984).
North Carolina has also adopted a new code using the rule-and-comment form
of the Model Rules; however, it is arranged under 10 canons like the Model Code.
See North Carolina Adopts Rules with Mixed Influences, Format, 1 LAw. MAN., supra, at
1026, 1026 (Oct. 30, 1985).
19 See Winter, supra note 13, at 4; see also Mallen, The New ABA Ethics Code.- Looking
at the Changes, 13 BRIEF, Feb. 1984, at 8, 8 ("The Code has been construed by disciplinary bodies and courts for a decade and a half. There will be a natural and
justified reluctance to abandon years of judicial construction and settled meaning
only to start the process all over again."); Reaves, 40 States Are at Work on New Ethics
Code, 6 B. LEADER, Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 24, 24 (discussing the adoption procedure of
the Model Rules by various states).
20 The New York State Bar rejected adoption of the rules because it believed
"that the current ethics code [the Model Code] was basically sound and that any
necessary changes could be accomplished through the amendment process." New
York, Oregon State Bars Reject Model-Rule Packages, 1 LAw. MAN., supra note 18, at 1047,
1047 (Nov. 13, 1985). In addition, the Oregon State Bar decided to retain its current code because of the body of law existing under it. Id. at 1048. Vermont has
likewise rejected adoption of the Model Rules. Two More States Adopt Versions of
Model Rules, supra note 18, at 856.
21 See articles cited supra note 18.
16
17
18
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own states when you get home.' "22 Furthermore, in the several
states where the Model Rules have been presented to the highest
courts of the states for final approval, many changes have been
suggested.23 As one commentator noted, it is possible that
" '[w]e'll end up with a multitude of codes that have a little something in common but are all basically different.' "24
Thus, a lawyer in interstate practice will be subject to the
jurisdiction of several states, each of which may have a unique
code of ethics. When those standards call for inconsistent
courses of conduct, the lawyer will need to know which code will
be considered controlling. At the present time, there are no
rules for deciding that question. This article will examine that
problem. First, it will set out some major differences among state
standards of ethical responsibility and describe the current system for regulating lawyers in interstate practice. Next, the question of which state's standard of professional conduct will be
applied to a lawyer involved in multijurisdictional practice will be
analyzed. This discussion will focus on the interpretation of the
comment to Model Rule 8.5, which calls for conflict-of-laws principles to be applied. Finally, some suggestions for improving the
system of regulating lawyers' ethics in multistate practice will be
made.

II.

MAJOR DIFFERENCES IN ETHICAL STANDARDS

As indicated above, the major sources of ethical standards
for the states are the Model Code and the Model Rules. Another
important source of disciplinary rules is the final draft of the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Draft Rules). 25 The differences in several major areas among these standards, as well as
22 Quade, New Ethics Code Now Is up to the States, 9 B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1983, at

24, 24 (quoting Michael Franck, executive director of the State Bar of Michigan and
a member of the commission).
23 See, e.g., Connecticut, Indiana Bars Urge Model Rules'Adoption, 1 LAW. MAN., supra
note 18, at 1065, 1065-66 (Nov. 27, 1985); Maryland Group Releases Report on Mlodel
Rules, 1 LAW. MAN., supra note 18, at 534, 534 (Nov. 28, 1984); Model Rules Adopted in
N.H., Advance in Two Other States, supra note 18, at 1142; Modified Rules of Conduct Go
to Florida Bar Governors, 1 LAW. MAN., supra note 18, at 191, 191 (May 2, 1984);
Nevada Adopts Model Rules; Bars Elsewhere Issue Reports, supra note 18, at 37-38.

24 Quade, supra note 22, at 24 (quoting Charles Kettlewell, past president of the
National Organization of Bar Counsel).
25 MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Final Draft 1982) [hereinafter cited

as DRAFT RULES]. For example, the proposed rules presented to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court substituted Draft Rule 7.3 for Model Rule 7.3 to regulate direct
contact with prospective clients. See States Take Steps Toward Adoption of Model Rules, 1
LAW. MAN., supra note 18, at 17, 17 (Jan. 25, 1984).
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among some of the new sets of rules proposed or adopted by the
states, are discussed below.
A.

Confidentiality
1. General Principles

Under the Model Code, a lawyer is directed to preserve confidences-"information protected by the attorney-client privilege"-and

secrets-"information

. . . that the

client has

requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of which would
be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client. ' 26 Model Rule 1.6 and Draft Rule 1.6 prevent the lawyer
from revealing "information relating to representation of a client."' 27 It is clear that the protection afforded by the Model Rules

is substantially broader than that provided by the Model Code.
In addition, Model Rule 1.6 and Draft Rule 1.6 "[do] not require
the client to indicate information that is to be confidential, or
permit the lawyer to speculate whether28 particular information
might be embarrassing or detrimental.

2. Exceptions
a. General Exception
Under the Model Code, a lawyer may disclose confidences or
secrets if a client consents after full disclosure.29 Under the
Model Rules and the Draft Rules, however, "full disclosure" has
been replaced by a requirement of "consultation," and an exception has been made "for disclosures that are impliedly authorized
in order to carry out the representation. "0 Thus, the Model
Rules and the Draft Rules have eliminated the requirement of
client consent in certain circumstances.
b. Future Crimes
The Model Code provides that "[a] lawyer may reveal . . .
[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."'3 The Model Rules permit a
26 MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 4-101(A).
27 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.6(a); DRAFr RULES,

supra note 25, Rule

1.6(a).
28 MODEL RULES,

supra note 15, Rule 1.6 note on code comparison;

RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.6 note on code comparison.
29 MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 4-101(C).
30 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.6(a); DRAFr RULES,

1.6(a).
31

MODEL CODE,

supra note 8, DR 4-101(C)(3).

DRAFr

supra note 25, Rule
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lawyer to reveal confidential information he "reasonably believes
necessary

. . .

to prevent the client from committing a criminal

act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or
substantial bodily harm."3' 2 The corresponding Draft Rule allows
a lawyer to divulge information if the client is about to commit "a
criminal or fraudulent act.

. .

likely to result in death or substan-

tial bodily harm, or in substantial injury to the financial interests
33
or property of another.

All three provisions are permissive-a lawyer is not required
to reveal such information. The Model Code allows disclosure of
information relating to any future crime, while the Model Rules
apply only to very serious crimes involving injury to a person.
The exception contained in the Draft Rules falls between the two
major standards, allowing revelation in cases of serious crimes
affecting people or property. 4
If a lawyer in multijurisdictional practice is subject to two or
more of these standards, he can comply with all of them by keeping everything confidential or by revealing information relating
only to serious crimes involving injuries to people. The standards enacted by some states, however, create the potential for a
lawyer's being subject to conflicting ethical obligations. In Virginia, for example, a lawyer is required to disclose his client's
stated intention to commit a crime.3 5 Thus, a lawyer admitted in
Virginia 36 and in another state where Model Rule 1.6 is adopted
32 MODEL RULES,

supra note 15, Rule 1.6(b)(l).

33 DRAFr RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.6(b)(1).
34 The Draft Rule also applies to frauds; the other standards do not. See DRAFr
RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.6(b)(2).
35 See VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI-ry DR 4-101(D)(1). This disciplinary rule states, "A lawyer shall reveal ... the intention of his client, as stated by
the client, to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime."
Id. (emphasis added).
36 Other states have a rule similar to Virginia's. New Jersey, the first state to
adopt a new ethics code based on the Model Rules, also enacted a standard that
requires a lawyer to reveal his client's intention to commit a crime. N. J. RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b). Rule 1.6 requires disclosure to prevent a client from committing a crime or fraudulent act that would result in another's death,
substantial bodily harm, or serious financial harm. Id. Nevada has adopted a similar rule. See Nevada Adopts Model Rules; Bars Elsewhere Issue Reports, supra note 18, at
37. Connecticut has proposed a similar amendment to rule 1.6. Connecticut, Indiana
Bars Urge Model Rules' Adoption, supra note 23, at 1065.
In a report submitted to the District of Columbia Bar, the professional conduct
committee, headed by Robert E. Jordan III, suggested adoption of a rule requiring
disclosure to prevent a criminal act likely to result in death or bodily harm. See
District of Columbia Bar Model Rules of Professional Conduct Committee, The
Model Rules of Professional Conduct with Proposed Revisions 47 (submitted to the
Board of Governors of the District of Columbia Bar on Sept. 10, 1985) [hereinafter

684

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:678

intact, 37 whose client tells him that he is going to commit a crime
involving serious property or financial damage, is under a Virginia obligation to reveal the information and another state's obligation to remain silent.
This particular conflict will not be the only one to arise. A
range of confidentiality exceptions may be adopted by the various states. For example, Arizona, which has approved a new
code of ethics based on the Model Rules, requires disclosure "of
a client's intent to commit a crime" likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm and permits disclosure in cases of less
serious crimes. 3 1 In Maryland 9 and Michigan 4' the rules recommended for adoption contain a confidentiality rule substantially
similar to Draft Rule 1.6. The version of rule 1.6 suggested in
New York4 ' permitted revelation of confidential information
where an "injury 'of a comparable seriousness' to death or substantial bodily harm" was likely."2 These different exceptions to
one rule indicate that a lawyer practicing in several states may
have to conform his conduct to a corresponding number of ethical codes.
c.

Future Frauds Involving Third Persons

Draft Rule 4.1 and Model Rule 4.1, which deal with truthfulness in statements made to persons other than clients, contain
the following common language: "In representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly . . .fail to disclose a material fact to a
cited as Jordan Report]. The committee gave two reasons for its suggestion: "First,
human life is of unique importance. Second, the Rule would come into play only in
the most extraordinary circumstances, and therefore would not pose a significant
threat to the systemic values that are protected by lawyer-client confidentiality." Id.
37 Delaware, Missouri, and Montana have adopted the Model Rules' version of
rule 1.6. Delawareand Washington Adopt New Ethics Rules, supra note 18, at 961; Missouri Adopts New Code Based on ABA Model Rules, supra note 18, at 924; Two More States
Adopt Versions of Model Rules, supra note 18, at 855. Furthermore, the Idaho, Indiana,
and New Mexico Bar Associations have recommended adoption of rule 1.6. Nevada
Adopts Model Rules; Bars Elsewhere Issue Reports, supra note 18, at 37-38; Connecticut,
Indiana Bars Urge Model Rules'Adoption, supra note 23, at 1066; New Mexico Court Gets
Proposal on Model Rules, 1 LAw. MAN., supra note 18, at 812, 812 (June 12, 1985).
38 Arizona Adopts New Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 18, at 446.
39 See Maryland Group Releases Report on Model Rules, supra note 23, at 534.
40 Michigan State Bar Proposes Rules of ProfessionalConduct, 1 LAw. MAN., supra note
18, at 70, 71 (Feb. 22, 1984).
41 Although the New York Bar rejected adoption of the Model Rules, it may
eventually amend the Model Code to reflect some of the changes discussed when it
considered the Model Rules. See supra note 20.
42 New York State Bar Committee Issues Report on Model Rules, 1 LAw. MAN., supra
note 18, at 613, 613 (Jan. 23, 1985).
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third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by a client."' 43 While the Draft Rule
applies even if the information is protected under the confidentiality provision of rule 1.6 44 the Model Rule is limited to disclosure of nonconfidential information under rule 1.6.
Consequently, an attorney admitted to practice in a state operating under Model Rule 4.146 and in a state following Draft Rule
4.1,47 who has confidential information that his client intends to
commit a fraud, will be subject to contrasting obligations in dealing with third persons who may be harmed.
d. Past Crimes or Frauds
The Draft Rules permit a lawyer to reveal information necessary "to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services have
been used."" 8 The Model Code, which is in force in a majority of
states, mandates that "[a] lawyer who receives information . . .
[that] his client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon
his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable
to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal."' 49 The Model Code provision is not only mandatory, but

broader in application-"in the course of representation" covers
more than "in the furtherance of which the lawyer's services have
been used." Under the Model Code, a lawyer must also warn his
client and give him a chance to make amends before disclosing
any information. 50 Such disclosure, however, is required only
43 See DRAFT
Rule 4.1.

RULES,

supra note 25, Rule 4.1(a)(2);

44 DRAFT-r RULES, supra note 25, Rule 4.1 (b).
45 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 4.1.
46 Delaware has adopted the Model Rules.

MODEL RULES, supra note

15,

Delaware and Washington Adopt New
Ethics Rules, supra note 18, at 961.
47 See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.1. In New Jersey, a
lawyer must reveal information if his client intends to commit a fraudulent act that
would result in death, substantial bodily harm, or serious financial loss. Id. Rule
1.6(b)(1). In contrast, the District of Columbia Bar Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Committee stated that it considered a rule that favored disclosure over
confidentiality undesirable for several reasons: "clients would no longer feel free
to entrust their lawyers with their confidences," the rule would lead to " 'selective
ignorance' " on the part of lawyers, and "frauds would be committed without any
opportunity for the lawyers to prevent them by persuasion." Jordan Report, supra
note 36, at 49.
48 DRAFT RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.6(b)(2).
49 MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-102(B)(1).
50 Id.
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with respect to past frauds and not with respect to past crimes
involving the lawyer's services. 5
The Model Rules contain no rule analogous to the ones set
forth above. Thus, in this area as well, a variety of rules may be
established by the states. For example, Draft Rule 1.6(b)(2) has
been recommended to the supreme courts of Maryland 52 and
Wisconsin.53 New Jersey Rule 1.6 requires disclosure of a fraud
on a tribunal and permits disclosure to rectify consequences of a
fraud if the lawyer's services have been used.54 In addition, as
discussed above, two versions of the Model Code rule are already
in effect.55
Litigation Costs

B.

Both the Model Rules and the Draft Rules state that "a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the
matter."' 56 The Model Code grants similar permission, but provides that "the client remains ultimately liable for such expenses. ' '57 Consequently, there may be a conflict. This conflict
will continue even if the Model Code is supplanted because when
adopting the Model Rules, some states have inserted the Model
Code limitation. 58

In a related area, the Model Rules and the Draft Rules both
provide that "a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay
court costs and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client."'5 9
The Model Code contains no analogous provision.
51 See id.
52

See Maryland Group Releases Report on Model Rules, supra note 23, at 535.

53 See Model Rules Recommendations Are Sent to Wisconsin Court, 1 LAw. MAN., supra

note 18, at 630, 630-31 (Feb. 6, 1985).
54 N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (2), (c) (1).
55 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
56 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.8(e)(1); DRAFr RULES, supra note 25, Rule
1.8(e)(1).
57 MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 5-103(B).
58 Arizona and Washington have continued the restriction in their new rules.
Arizona Adopts New Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 18, at 446; Delaware and
Washington Adopt New Ethics Rules, supra note 18, at 962. In addition, the New Mexico and West Virginia committees have proposed that the limitations be included in
their rules. New Mexico Court Gets Proposalon Model Rules, supra note 37, at 812; Model
Rules Adopted in N.H., Advance in Two Other States, supra note 18, at 1142.
59 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.8(e)(2); DRAFT RULES, supra note 25, Rule
1.8(e)(2).
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Fees
1.

Contingent Fees

The Draft Rules permit contingent fees in criminal cases. 60
Both the Model Rules and the Model Code, on the other hand,
prohibit contingent fees in such cases. 6 ' It is likely that the Draft
Rules' version will be followed in some states. Already, the rules
suggested to the Florida bar governors have modified rule 1.5 to
follow the Draft Rules' version.6 2 Contingent fee arrangements
must be in writing according to both the Draft Rules and the
Model Rules. 6 ' Although a written fee agreement is suggested in
the ethical considerations,' the Model Code contains no such
requirement.
2.

Division of Fees

Division of fees between lawyers who are not in the same
firm is allowed under all three of the primary sets of standards,
but the conditions on division vary among them. The Model
Code6 5 and the Draft Rules 6 6 both require that the client consent,
while the Model Rules only require that the client not object after
being advised. 6 7 The Model Code permits division only in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, 68 while the
newer codes allow division in disproportionate amounts if the client agrees in writing and each lawyer assumes joint responsibility. 6 9 Some states have adopted Model Rule 1.5 without
amending it, 70 while others have retained the7 1Model Code's requirement that the client consent to division.
60 DRAFT RULES, supra note
61 MODEL RULES, supra note

25, Rule 1.5(c).
15, Rule 1.5(d)(2);

MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 2106(c).
62 See Modified Rules of Conduct Go to Florida Bar Governors, supra note 23, at 191.
63 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.5(c); DRAFT RULES, supra note 25, Rule
1.5(c).
64 MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC 2-19.
65 Id. DR 2-107(A)(1).
66 DRAFT RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.5(e)(2).
67 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.5(e)(2).
68 MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 2-107(A)(2).
69 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.5(e)(l); DRAFT RULES, supra note 25, Rule
1.5(e)(l).
70 See, e.g., Delaware and Washington Adopt New Ethics Rules, supra note 18, at 961
(Delaware); Missouri Adopts New Code Based on ABA Model Rules, supra note 18, at 924.
71 E.g., Nevada Adopts Model Rules as They Take Effect in N.H., 2 LAw. MAN. supra
note 18, at 14, 14 (Feb. 5, 1986) (New Hampshire). The Jordan Committee in the
District of Columbia proposed giving the client much more information about what
lawyers will be involved, how responsibility will be divided among those lawyers,
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Successive Government and Private Employment

The Model Code establishes the rule that "[a] lawyer shall
not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee. ' 72 Rule
1.11 of the newer codes follows this general principle, but allows
the government to consent to the ex-employee's representation.7 3 In addition, rule 1.11 allows the lawyer's firm to undertake
the representation so long as the disqualified lawyer is screened
from participation, receives no fee, and the government is
notified. 4
The Draft and Model Rules contain provisions regarding a
private lawyer's use of confidential information obtained while
employed by the government and a government lawyer's participation in matters in which he was involved while in private practice. 75 There are no equivalent sections in the Model Code. As
with other rules, this Model Rule has been modified by some
states prior to adoption. In New Jersey, for example, the government cannot consent to a lawyer's participation in matters in
which he was previously substantially involved. 7 6 Moreover, even
if a lawyer had not substantially participated in the matter while
in public service, he may still be disqualified under the New
Jersey Rules if there is an "appearance of impropriety. ' 7 7 Furthermore, the disqualified lawyer's firm cannot become involved
if the lawyer had substantially participated in the matter unless
the disqualification is based only upon an appearance of impropriety and the disqualified lawyer is properly screened.7 8
E.

OrganizationalClients

Unlike the Model Code, which contains no mandatory standards for representing an organizational client, 79 the Model
and how the association of lawyers outside the firm will affect the fee to be charged.
Jordan Report, supra note 36, at 30.
72 MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 9-101(B).
73 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.1 (a); DRAFt RULES, supra note 25, Rule
1.1 1(a).
74 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.1 l(a)(l), (2); DRAFT RULES, supra note 25,
Rule 1.11(a)(1), (2).
75 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.11(b), (c); DRAFT RULES, supra note 25,
Rule 1.11 (b), (c).
76 See N. J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1. 11 (a).
77 Id. Rule 1.11(b).
78 Id.
71) The ethical considerations accompanying Canon 5 provide that a lawyer in
such circumstances "owes his allegiance to the entity." MODEL CODE, supra note 8,
EC 5-18.
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Rules and the Draft Rules establish guidelines for an attorney
representing such a client. The Draft Rules differ from the
Model Rules, however, in situations where "the organization's
highest authority insists upon action, or refuses to take action,
that is clearly a violation of a legal obligation to the organization,
or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to the
organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the
organization." 8 The Draft Rules allow the lawyer in such a situation to reveal information otherwise protected by the confidentionly
ality provisions of Rule 1.6,81 whereas the Model Rules
82
permit a lawyer to resign under the same circumstances.
Michigan 3 and Maryland8 4 have indicated a preference for
permissive disclosure under such circumstances, such as that
found in the Draft Rules' version of rule 1.13. Minnesota has
adopted a variation of rule 1.13 omitting the last requirement of
substantial injury to the organization.8 5 Therefore, there is once
again the potential for two or more different standards to be in
force in the states adopting ethical codes based on the new rules.
Moreover, it is likely that lawyers representing large corporations
will be engaged in multistate practice. These corporate lawyers
will thus be subject to conflicting rules about when they should
or must "blow the whistle" on their clients.
F.

Role as an Advocate
1.

Meritorious Claims and Contentions

The Model Code provides that a lawyer may not act "on behalf of [a] client when he knows or when it is obvious that such
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."'8 6 In contrast, Model Rule and Draft Rule 3.1 establish an
objective standard: An attorney shall act on behalf of his client
only if "there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.' 8 7 Some
states have retained the subjective standard when adopting the
Model Rules. For instance, New Jersey requires an attorney to
know or have a reasonable belief that his actions are not frivo80
81
82
83
84

See DRAFr RULES, supra note 25, Rule 1.13(c).
Id.
MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.13(c).
Michigan State Bar Proposes Rules of Professional Conduct, supra note 40, at 71.
Maryland Group Releases Report on Model Rules, supra note 23, at 535.

85 Reports on Model Rules Released in Ill., Utah, 1 LAw. MAN., supra note 18, at 881,
882 (July 24, 1985).
t(

MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-102(A)(1).

87 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 3.1; DRAFr RULES, supra note 25, Rule 3. 1.
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lous. 8 The rules adopted by the
Delaware Supreme Court also
89
contain a subjective standard.

2.

Candor Toward the Tribunal

All three of the major standards prohibit a lawyer from
knowingly presenting perjured testimony or false evidence.9 ° Differences arise in reference to a lawyer's discovery of false evidence after it has been offered. Both the Model Rules and the
Draft Rules require a lawyer to take remedial measures, including
disclosure of information otherwise protected under Rule 1.6. 9 1
The Model Code similarly requires a lawyer to reveal the "fraud"
to the court if the client refuses to do so, but
limits the informa92
tion he can reveal to unprivileged material.
In tailoring the Model Rules to their jurisdictions, some
states have added another requirement to Rule 3.3, obliging the
lawyer to disclose a material fact, the omission of which might
tend to mislead the tribunal.93 Other states have recommended
that a lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal be extended beyond
the conclusion of the proceedings.94 Under the Model Rules, the
attorney's obligation terminates along with the proceedings. 95
G.

Information About Legal Services

Rules regarding advertising of legal services are not likely to
be the same in any two states. Most state commissions that have
recommended adopting the Model Rules have suggested
changes in rules 7.1 through 7.5.96

The Model Rules generally prohibit a lawyer from making
false or misleading statements about himself or his services.97
88 N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1.
89 Delaware and Washington Adopt New Ethics Rules, supra note 18,
90 MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 7-102(A)(4); MODEL RULES,

Rule 3.3(a)(4);

DRAFT RULES,

at 962.
supra note 15,

supra note 25, Rule 3.3(a)(4).

91 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 3.3(a)(4), (b); DRAFT RULES, supra note 25,

Rule 3.3(a)(4), (b).
92 See supra note 12.
93 See, e.g., N. J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(5).
94 See Modified Rules of Conduct Go to Florida Bar Governors, supra note 23, at 191;
Minnesota Committee Urges Adoption of Amended Rules, 1 LAW. MAN., supra note 18, at
237, 238 (May 30, 1984).
95 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 3.3(b).
96 Modied Rules of Conduct Go to FloridaBar Governors, supra note 23, at 192; Maryland Group Releases Report on Model Rules, supra note 23, at 534-35; Minnesota Committee
Urges Adoption of Amended Rules, supra note 94, at 238; States Take Steps Toward Adoption
of Model Rules, supra note 25, at 17 (New Jersey and Pennsylvania).
97 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 7.1.
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98
Comparisons with other lawyers are allowed if based on fact.
The corresponding New Jersey rule prohibits any such comparisons, whether or not based on fact. 99 Prior to adoption, Arizona
proposed a prohibition against any "self-laudatory" communications.'0 0 Wisconsin, on the other hand, may permit "testimonials
or paid endorsements" if the recommended version of rule 7.1 is
adopted. 101
When pecuniary gain is a "significant motive," the Model
Rules limit direct solicitation to clients, former clients, and relatives.1 0 2 Solicitation by way of advertising circulars distributed or
mailed to unknown persons is allowed, however. 1 3 Arizona has
gone further by deleting the "significant motive" provision,
thereby prohibiting solicitation if there is any pecuniary motive. 10 4 Delaware, in one of its few amendments to the Model
Rules, enacted a provision proscribing direct solicitation
altogether.' 0 5 Taking a different approach, New Jersey, 1 6 Montana,' 0 7 and Missouri 0 8 adopted, and the Maryland,O 9 Connecticut, 1 10 and Wisconsin"' committees endorsed, Draft Rule 7.3.
That version of the rule prohibits contact with a prospective client if the targeted person lacks the capability to exercise reasonable judgment, has made it known that he does not want to
receive information, or if "the communication involves coercion,
duress, or harassment." ' 1 2 Personal contact is allowed only with

98
99

Id. Rule 7.1 (c).
N.J. RULES OF

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

Rule 7.1(a)(3).

100 Arizona Bar Wants Adoption of Model Rules with Amendments, 1 LAW. MAN., supra

note 18, at 264, 264 (June 13, 1984).
101 Model Rules Recommendations Are Sent to Wisconsin Court, supra note 53, at 631.
102 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 7.3.
103 Id.
104 Arizona Adopts New Rules of ProfessionalConduct, supra note 18, at 446.
105 See Delaware and Washington Adopt New Ethics Rules, supra note 18, at 961.
106 See N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3(b).
107 Two More States Adopt Versions of Model Rules, supra note 18, at 855.
108 Missouri Adopts New Code Based on ABA Model Rules, supra note 18, at 924.

109 Maryland Group Releases Report on Model Rules, supra note 23, at 535.
110 Connecticut, Indiana Bars Urge Model Rules'Adoption, supra note 23, at 1065-66.

III Model Rules Recommendations Are Sent to Wisconsin Court, supra note 53, at 631.
112 DRAFT RULES, supra note 25, Rule 7.3(b). The restrictions on advertising and
solicitation proposed by the District of Columbia's Jordan Committee represent an
approach taken by many states in this area of professional responsibility. The rules
recommended by this committee collapse Model Rules 7.1 through 7.4 into one
rule. Rather than creating separate rules for advertising, contact with prospective
clients, and discussion of fields of practice, the Jordan Committee formulated one
standard for all lawyer advertising and solicitation. The general rule proposed by
the committee is as follows: "A lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services." Jordan Report, supra note 36, at
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friends, relatives, and clients and under
the auspices of various
3
public or charitable organizations."
The differences discussed above do not come close to exhausting the variations among the three major standards. Conflicts in rules regarding diligence," 4 communication with
clients," 5 and permissive withdrawal" 6 are some of the many
other areas of conflict. Even the Model Rule providing for the
application of choice-of-law principles to resolve these conflicts is
7
not being uniformly recommended."
In summary, a lawyer practicing in more than one state is
subject to codes of professional responsibility that differ in many
areas, sometimes in quite significant ways. Whether the diverse
obligations interfere with the lawyer's practice depends on
whether each state to which he is admitted expects him to obey
its standards at all times. The remainder of this article will examine this question.
III.

A.

JURISDICTION OVER LAWYERS IN MULTISTATE PRACTICE

Jurisdictionover Lawyers Admitted to Regular Practice

1.

In Theory

It is the general rule that a lawyer admitted to practice in a
state is subject to discipline for his misconduct no matter where
the misconduct occurs.'
The ABA Standards for Lawyer Disci206 (proposed rule 7.1 (a)). A communication is defined as being false or misleading if it contains a material misrepresentation, omits a material fact, or "contains an
assertion about the lawyer or the lawyer's services that cannot be substantiated."
Id. (proposed rule 7.1 (a)(1), (2)). Statements concerning fields of practice and solicitation of clients by mail are governed only by the general principle. See id. at
210-11. Regarding personal contacts, the committee decided not to adopt the
"broad restrictions" of Model Rule 7.3, opting instead to identify "the particular
abuses at which the Rule" had been aimed. Id. at 211. Therefore, the provision
suggested by the Jordan Committee prohibits misleading statements, the use of
undue influence, solicitation of clients who cannot "exercise reasonable, considered judgment in selecting a lawyer," or "use of an intermediary where the lawyer
knows or could reasonably ascertain that the intermediary's actions violate the intermediary's contractual or other legal obligation." Id.
113 DRAnr RULES, supra note 25, Rule 7.3(a).
114 Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.3 with MODEL CODE, supra note 8,
DR 6-101(A)(3), EC 6-4, DR 7-101(A)(1), (3).
115 Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.4 with MODEL CODE, supra note 8,
DR 9-102(B)(1), EC 7-8, EC 9-2.
'16 Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.16(b) with MODEL CODE, supra
note 8, DR 2-1 10(C).
117 For a discussion of Model Rule 8.5, see infra notes 182-201.
118 See In re Kimball, 40 A.D.2d 252, 254, 339 N.Y.S.2d 302, 305 ("[Tlhe sensitive
office of an attorney must be continually subject to the control of the courts in
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pline and Disability Proceedings (ABA Standards) provide that
"[a] lawyer admitted to practice in a state should be subject to
thejurisdiction of its agency."" 9 The accompanying commentary
further explains that
[a]dmission to practice triggers the jurisdiction of the agency,
regardless of the location of the lawyer, the place where the
act occurred, or whether the lawyer is actively engaged in the
practice of law. The license is the court's proclamation to the
public that the lawyer is qualified to practice; the court has the
right and the obligation
to inquire into any facts bearing upon
20
the proclamation. 1
A 1982 survey of state bar counsel indicated that, in all of the
thirty-five states responding, bars' counsels have the authority to investigate and discipline attorneys licensed to practice by the state,
without regard to whether the misconduct occurs within or without

12 2
the state. 12 1 My own survey of state supreme court and bar rules

indicates that none contains a provision contrary to the general rule
that "[a]ny lawyer admitted to practice law in this state . . is sub2
ject to the disciplinary jurisdiction of this court and the board.' 1
While the Model Code does not contain a provision onjurisdiction, Model Rule 8.5 explicitly incorporates the principles set forth
above. The rule states that "[a] lawyer admitted to practice in this
jurisdiction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction
24
although engaged in practice elsewhere.'

1'

which the attorney practices."), modified, 41 A.D.2d 780, 342 N.Y.S.2d 373, rev'd, 33
N.Y.2d 586, 301 N.E.2d 436, 347 N.Y.S.2d 453 (1973).
119 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 4.1.
120 Id. § 4.1 commentary.
121 See Cox, Regulation of Attorneys PracticingBefore FederalAgencies, 34 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 173, 230 (1984) (responses to the survey are on file with the Case Western
Reserve Law Review). Only 33 states affirmed the following statement: "You have
authority to investigate, discipline, etc. an attorney licensed to practice by your
State, without regard to whether misconduct occurs within or without your State."
Id. The comments of the other two states, however, indicate that they also retain
the power to discipline lawyers for out-of-state misconduct. See id. Maine, one of
the two states to answer negatively, indicated that its jurisdiction extended to cases
outside of Maine involving a lawyer's moral turpitude or wrongdoing involving
cheating, lying, or stealing. Id. Maine stated that it answered negatively because it
assumed that a lawyer practicing elsewhere would not be engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, but would be admitted to practice in the other state and would
be subject to that state's disciplinary jurisdiction. Id. The other state to answer
negatively, South Carolina, indicated that it retains jurisdiction over an admitted
attorney practicing elsewhere, but that it relies on the regulatory agency of the
other state to initiate disciplinary action. Id.
122 See, e.g., ALA. R. SuP. CT. 1(a); ARIZ. R. Sup. CT. 46(a).
123 MODEL RULES FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 6(A) (1985).
124 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 8.5. For an extended discussion of Model
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In Practice

The state that admits a lawyer who does not practice solely
in that state has a problem in policing the lawyer's out-of-state
conduct. It needs to receive information about the lawyer's conduct in the foreign jurisdiction. A state can receive such information through one or more of the following means: broadcast or
publication in the admitting state of material concerning the lawyer, a complaint made to the admitting state, conviction of a
crime, or disciplinary action taken elsewhere.
a.

Broadcast or Publication of Information

While testifying in the 1974 trial of Maurice Stans and John
Mitchell in the Southern District of New York, a former chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission,12 5 who was a member of the Nebraska Bar, admitted to having lied in a previous
Watergate-related trial. 12 6 The press reported this information,
and it came to the attention of the attorney's colleagues in Nebraska. 12 7 Although he was never prosecuted for perjury, his conduct outside the state and outside the practice of law caused the
attorney to be suspended from the practice of law in Nebraska for
28
three years. 1
Similarly, the Nevada Supreme Court disciplined an attorney
for out-of-state conduct. In 1938, a lawyer admitted to practice
in Nevada and California published an advertisement in a California newspaper. 29 This advertisement attracted the attention
of the State Bar of Nevada, which determined that by his actions
in California, the attorney had violated a Nevada rule against
soliciting professional employment. 30 In reviewing the determination of the administrative committee, the Supreme Court of
Nevada held that it had jurisdiction even though the attorney's
actions occurred in California and imposed sanctions on the at13 1
torney for violation of the ethical standards of Nevada.
Rule 8.5 and its implication in various situations, see infra notes 182-265 and accompanying text.
125 State ex rel. Neb. State Bar Ass'n v. Cook, 194 Neb. 364, 373, 232 N.W.2d
120, 125 (1975).
126 Id. at 365-66, 232 N.W.2d at 121.
127 Id.
128 See id. at 388, 232 N.W.2d at 132.
129 In re Porep, 60 Nev. 393, 394-95, 111 P.2d 533, 534 (1941).
130 Id. at 395, 111 P.2d at 534.
'3' Id. at 396, 400-01, 111 P.2d at 535, 537.
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b. Complaint
Someone who perceives misconduct by a lawyer engaged in
practice out-of-state will most likely report that misconduct to the
disciplinary authorities in the state where it occurs, rather than in
the home state of the lawyer. If the aggrieved person knows
where the attorney is admitted, however, a complaint to the
home state may result. For example, in March of 1981, a Maryland resident complained to the West Virginia and Maryland
Bars that her lawyer, admitted in West Virginia and representing
her pro hac vice in a Maryland case, had attempted to obstruct
justice and had failed to assist his successor counsel. 32 The West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that a West Virginia
remains
lawyer admitted pro hac vice to the bar of another state
1 33
subject to the West Virginia State Bar's jurisdiction.
c. Conviction of a Crime
The Model Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement provide that "[i]t shall be a ground for discipline for a lawyer to...
[c]ommit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. ' ' 134 Likewise, the ABA Standards state that "[d]iscipline
may be imposed for . . . conviction of a crime."' 1

5

In most

states, statutes, court rules, or bar rules establish conviction of a
crime-wherever committed-as grounds for discipline. 136 Even
in the absence of such rules, however, courts have generally held
that an attorney's conviction in another state may provide the basis for disciplinary action in the state where the attorney is admitted. 137 For instance, without discussing any disciplinary rules,
the Alaska Supreme Court held that a conviction of grand larceny
upon a guilty plea in Washington was grounds for disbarment in
Alaska. '

38

Although the conviction of a crime in another state facilitates
the disciplinary process, it is not absolutely necessary. Usually,
132 Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 327 S.E.2d 671, 672-73 (W. Va. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1395 (1985).
133 Id. at 673.
134 MODEL RULES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123, Rule 9(b).
135 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 5.1 (a).
136 See, e.g., N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4.
'37 See, e.g., Alaska Bar Ass'n v. Benton, 431 P.2d 146 (Alaska 1967); Kentucky
State Bar Ass'n v. Scott, 409 S.W.2d 293 (Ky. 1966) (per curiam); In re Murphy, 60
A.D.2d 1010, 402 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1977).
138 See Alaska Bar Ass'n v. Benton, 431 P.2d 146, 146-48 (Alaska 1967).
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the actions that lead to the attorney's conviction also violate the
ethical standards of the state. For example, in one case, the Hawaii Supreme Court based discipline of a lawyer convicted in California for grand theft on his violations of Hawaii's Model Code
of Professional Responsibility.'
d.

Reciprocal Discipline

The Special Committee on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement of the American Bar Association (ABA Special Committee) has stated that "[w]hen an attorney admitted to practice
in several jurisdictions is disciplined in one of them, his license in
the other is not affected automatically. A separate disciplinary
proceeding in each jurisdiction in which the attorney is admitted
is required.""' Until recently, the lack of communication and coordination among states has been a major problem in policing
the ethics of lawyers engaged in multistate practice."' In 1967,
only three states provided by statute that disbarment in one state
was grounds for disbarment proceedings in the second state."' 2
In 1970, the ABA Special Committee found that most jurisdictions had not considered what effect should "be given to discipline imposed on a member of their bar by another
jurisdiction."

14

3

In some states, courts have held that the judgment of a sister
state disbarring a lawyer has to be given effect locally under the
full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. 44 In other states,
courts have decided that the judgment of a sister state disbarring
a lawyer is entitled to recognition in disciplinary proceedings
against the lawyer in the forum state under the doctrine of comity. 145 More recently, however, courts have held that the full faith
139 See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Cashman, 63 Hawaii 382, 382-84, 389,
629 P.2d 105, 105-06, 109 (1981).
140

ABA

SPECIAL

COMM.

ON

EVALUATION

OF

DISCIPLINARY

ENFORCEMENT,

RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 116 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS].
141 See Note, Attorneys: Interstate and Federal Practice, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1711, 1728
PROBLEMS

AND

(1967). The author states that there was "apparently no explicit understanding
among any states that questionable conduct in one jurisdiction [would] lead to an
investigation in the attorney's home state." Id.
Id.
143 PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 140, at 116.
144 See, e.g., In re Van Bever, 55 Ariz. 368, 373, 101 P.2d 790, 792 (1940); In re
142

Leverson, 195 Minn. 42, 43, 261 N.W. 480, 481 (1935) (per curiam); In re Veach,
365 Mo. 776, 784-85, 287 S.W.2d 753, 759 (1956).
145 Copren v. State Bar, 64 Nev. 364, 384, 183 P.2d 833, 842 (1947); In re Brown,
60 S.D. 628, 629-30, 245 N.W. 824, 824 (1932) (per curiam).
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and credit clause does not require the imposition of discipline by
the forum state. 14 6 Those decisions have determined that foreign
judgments do not purport to disbar the attorney in foreign
that the forstates.147 Nevertheless, those courts have also held
148
eign jurisdictions' findings of fact are conclusive.
In most states today, the problem of reciprocal discipline is
dealt with by court rule, statute, or bar rule."49 The rule for reciprocal discipline proposed by the ABA Special Committee suggested that the home state impose the same discipline as the
foreign jurisdiction. 150 The rule stated that imposition of identical discipline can be challenged only if the record on which the
discipline was based discloses (1) a lack of notice or opportunity
for hearing that violates due process, (2) an "infirmity of proof,"
(3) that imposing the same discipline would result in a "grave
injustice," or (4) that the misconduct warranted substantially different discipline in the home state. 15 1 The due process, "infirmity
of proof," and "grave injustice" exceptions reflect the approach
taken by the Federal courts in disciplining attorneys who have
been disciplined by state courts. 152
The ABA Standards 5 3 and the Model Rules for Disciplinary
Enforcement' 54 fleshed out and codified the rule proposed by the
ABA Special Committee. Rule 21(A) requires a lawyer disciplined in a foreign state to inform his home state bar's counsel of
the action.' 55 The rule further instructs the bar's counsel to obtain promptly a copy of the foreign disciplinary order.' 56 The
146 See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1965); Kentucky Bar
Ass'n v. Signer, 533 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Ky. 1976) (per curiam); In re Weiner, 530
S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo. 1975) (en banc); In re Kimball, 40 A.D.2d 252, 254, 339
N.Y.S.2d 302, 305 (1973) (per curiam).
147 Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1965); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Signer, 533 S.W.2d 534, 536 (Ky. 1976) (per curiam).
148 Florida Bar v. Wilkes, 179 So. 2d 193, 197 (Fla. 1965); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Signer, 533 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Ky. 1976) (per curiam).
149 See, e.g., ALA. R. SuP. CT. 17; ARIz. R. SuP. CT. 58; COLO. CT. R. 241.17; PA. R.
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 216; TEX. STATE BAR R. art. 10, § 27; Wisc. SuP. CT. R.
22.25.
150 PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 140, at 121.
151 Id. The ABA Standards permit the bar's counsel to argue for greater discipline. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 10.3; see also Florida Bar v. Baker, 419 So. 2d
1054, 1055 (Fla. 1982) (per curiam) (greater discipline ordered in Florida than had
been imposed in New York).
152 See, e.g., Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957); Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917); In re Rhodes, 370 F.2d 411, 413 (8th Cir. 1967).
153 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 10.
154 See MODEL RULES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123, Rule 21.
155 Id. Rule 21 (A).
1.56 Id.
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lawyer is then given notice of receipt of the foreign order and is
directed to explain within thirty days why identical discipline
should not be imposed. 57 The identical discipline is imposed unless the lawyer or the bar's counsel can demonstrate that any of
the factors mentioned in the rule proposed by the ABA Special
Committee are present.'15 In all other aspects, the final adjudication in the foreign jurisdiction conclusively establishes the misconduct for the purposes of the forum state's disciplinary
59
proceeding.
Many states now have rules imposing reciprocal discipline.' 60 Most of them have a rule very similar to that proposed
by the ABA Special Committee and embodied in the ABA Standards and Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement.' 6 ' By establishing regular rules for reciprocal discipline, states have
taken a step toward solving what has been considered a major
problem with multistate practice-ensuring that the lawyer is
held responsible for his misconduct.
B. Jurisdiction over Foreign Lawyers
1.

Pro Hac Vice

An out-of-state attorney who wishes to appear before a court
in a state where he is not admitted must apply for admission pro
hac vice. In forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, court
rules or statutes governing admission to the bar regulate admission pro hac vice. 16 2 Among other things, such rules help "ensure that lawyers are amenable to the jurisdiction's disciplinary
proceedings for any unethical conduct arising from practice
157 Id. Rule 21(B).
158

ABA

STANDARDS,

supra note 4, § 10.2 commentary; MODEL RULES

FOR

Disci-

PLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123, Rule 2 1(D). The burden is on the lawyer to

show that less punishment is called for and on the bar's counsel to show that more
is deserved. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 10.3.
159 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 10.2; MODEL RULES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123, Rule 21(E).
160 Twenty-two states provide that the bar association's counsel must be notified
by a lawyer when the lawyer is convicted of a crime. ABA Center for Professional
Responsibility, Survey of Lawyer Disciplinary Procedures in the United States 30
(May 1984). Thirty-eight states have a rule similar to ABA Standard § 9.4 providing that bar counsel need only prove entry of a foreign criminal judgment against
the lawyer, leaving the disciplinary board to consider only the nature and extent of
the discipline to be imposed upon the convicted lawyer. Id.
161 Twenty-four states have adopted rules similar to ABA Standard § 10.1, and
32 states have rules much like ABA Standard § 10.2. Id. at 31.
162 See E. MICHELMAN, PRO HAC VICE REGULATION-IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST?
4 (1984). Ohio is the exception to the rule. Id. at 4 & n.13.
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within the jurisdiction."' 63 The commentary to ABA Standard
4.2 explains that
[i]t is inappropriate for the state in which the lawyer is specially admitted to rely exclusively upon the lawyer's home jurisdiction to enforce ethical standards. The witnesses and
other evidence of misconduct are likely to be located in the
adopted jurisdiction. Moreover, the jurisdiction in which the
misconduct occurred will be far more interested in pursuing
the matter.164

Most pro hac vice regulations provide that the forum state acquires disciplinary jurisdiction when the lawyer requests admission
to appear pro hac vice or files a statement submitting himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. 16 5 For example, the Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement state that "any lawyer specially admitted by a
court of this state for a particular proceeding . . . is subject to the
disciplinary jurisdiction of this court and the board."' 6 6 Thus, it is
clear that a lawyer specially admitted to practice in another state is
1 67
subject to that state's disciplinary power.
2.

Out-of-State Office Practice

The general rule governing jurisdiction over out-of-state attorneys engaged in activities outside of court is that
a person licensed as a lawyer in another jurisdiction, not generally or specially admitted to practice in the state, should not
be subject to the jurisdiction of the state's agency. .

.

.If that

lawyer engages in misconduct in the state, the matter should
be referred to the state where the lawyer is licensed. If the
163

Id. at 2.

ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 4.2 commentary. The standard itself states,
"All lawyers specially admitted to practice in a state for a limited purpose should be
subject to the jurisdiction of the [disciplinary] agency in the state with respect to
any misconduct related to that purpose." Id. § 4.2.
165 E. MICHELMAN,supra note 162, at 6 & nn.35-36. Under a uniform pro hac vice
standard proposed in 1980, an attorney so admitted to practice would be deemed
to have submitted to the disciplinary system of the specially admitting state. ABA
Annual Meeting, 49 U.S.L.W. 2125, 2125 (1980). The rule was rejected by the ABA
House of Delegates because they believed the proposed standard made it too easy
to cross state lines. Id.
166 MODEL RULES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123, Rule 6(A).
Many state disciplinary rules resemble rule 6(A). E.g., ARIz. R. SuP. CT. 46(b);
COLO. CT. R. 241.1 (b).
167 See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Shane, 553 S.W.2d 467 (Ky. 1977) (per curiam)
(holding member of Ohio Bar, who was co-counsel in Kentucky civil court action,
subject to jurisdiction of Supreme Court of Kentucky). In Washington, the Model
Rules apply to lawyers both licensed and specially admitted in the state. Delaware
and Washington Adopt New Ethics Rules, supra note 18, at 963.
164
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misconduct involved practice of law in a state in which the lawyer is not admitted, he may be prosecuted by that state for
unauthorized practice. 68
Thus, while he is not subject to discipline in the foreign state, I 69 an
out-of-state lawyer risks violating the restrictions on unauthorized
practice of the foreign state. In thirty-seven states, such action is a
misdemeanor.' 70 In seven other states, contempt-of-court statutes
providefor enforcement of the rules governing unauthorized practice. t 71 Moreover, such unauthorized practice is a violation of both
the Model Code

IV.
A.

72

173
and the Model Rules.

ETHICAL STANDARD

To BE APPLIED

Lawyer Admitted in One Jurisdiction
1.

Prior to the Model Rules

When a lawyer is subject to the jurisdiction of a state disciplinary agency, he is expected to conform his conduct to that state's
ethical code. Most states' rules permit discipline to be imposed
when the attorney violates a professional-conduct rule of that jurisdiction. 174 The Model Rules for Disciplinary Enforcement establish the following as grounds for discipline: to "[v]iolate or
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly
assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of
75
another."1
Because the state retains jurisdiction over the lawyer when
168 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 4.1 commentary; see also Attorney Grievance
Comm'n v. Hyatt, 302 Md. 683, 689-90, 490 A.2d 1224, 1227 (1985) (member of
Ohio Bar never admitted in Maryland not considered an attorney in Maryland and
therefore not subject to discipline).
169 But see Arkansas Adopts New Code Based on ABA Model Rules, supra note 18, at
1126 (Arkansas Rule 8.5 applicable to all lawyers practicing in state, even if not
formally admitted); MODEL RULES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123,
Rule 6(A) (alternative version stating standards apply to "any lawyer not admitted
in this state who practices law or renders legal services in this state").
170 Rhode, Policing the ProfessionalMonopoly: A Constitutionaland EmpiricalAnalysis of
Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions,34 STAN. L. REV. 1, 11 & n.39 (1981).
171 Id. at 11 n.38.
172 MODEL CODE, supra note 8, DR 3-101 (B). The rule states, "A lawyer shall not
practice law in ajurisdiction where to do so would be in violation of regulations of
the profession in that jurisdiction." Id.
173 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 5.5(a). The rule states, "A lawyer shall not
• . .practice law in ajurisdiction where doing so violates the regulation of the legal
profession in that jurisdiction." Id.
174 See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 5.1 (b). Many state rules are almost identical to the ABA Standards. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. SuP. CT. 51(b); ARK. RULES REGULATING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OF ATTORNEYS AT LAW Rule I.
175 MODEL RULES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123, Rule 9(a).
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he engages in out-of-state activities, it is expected that he will
continue to obey the state's standard of professional conduct
when he acts outside the state.' 7 6 As one court has observed,
The . . . oath of office as an attorney and counselor at law is
not only binding here . . . but everywhere. He cannot put it
aside or renounce it at pleasure. It abides with him at all times
and places, and he will be held responsible to this court for his
misconduct as an attorney so long as his name continues on
the roll; nor can he put himself in a position which will place
bar
him beyond the inherent power of this court to purify the
1 77
of its unworthy members, and to keep its roster clean.
Under the now prevailing rules, if a lawyer commits an unethical act in a state where he is not admitted, he will either be subject to
laws restricting unauthorized practice, ' 7 8 or the foreign state will refer the matter to the licensing state. 179 The referring state-in accordance with the analysis above-expects that the lawyer will be
disciplined according to the standards of the jurisdiction to which
he is admitted.' 8 °
Why then should there be any concern about conflicting ethical
obligations if the lawyer is admitted only in one jurisdiction? Because an unelaborated comment to Model Rule 8.5 suggests that
' 81
"principles of conflict of laws may apply."'
2.

Model Rule 8.5

Model Rule 8.5 restates the usual rule of jurisdiction. 8 2 It
clearly establishes that lawyers who "act outside the territorial
limits of the jurisdiction in which they are licensed to practice
. . . remain subject to the governing authority of the jurisdiction
in which they are licensed to practice."' 183 By itself, this rule
presents no unusual problems because it is jurisdictional only.
The accompanying comment, on the other hand, goes beyond
176 See, e.g., Committee on Legal Ethics v. Blair, 327 S.E.2d 671, 673 (W. Va.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1395 (1985).
177 People ex rel. Colo. Bar Ass'n v. Lindsey, 86 Colo. 458, 478, 283 P. 539, 546

(1929).
178
179
180

See supra notes 168-173 and accompanying text.

See ABA

STANDARDS,

supra note 4, § 4.1 commentary.

Telephone interview with Robert Wells, ABA liaison to the National Organization of Bar Counsel (Apr. 9, 1985); Telephone interview with Melvin Herschman,
Bar Counsel to the Maryland Attorney Grievance Commission (Apr. 12, 1985).
181 MODEL RULES, supra note
182 See id. Rule 8.5. The rule

15, Rule 8.5 comment.
states, "A lawyer admitted to practice in this juris-

diction is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction although engaged

in practice elsewhere." Id.
183 Id. Rule 8.5 comment.
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jurisdiction into the realm of conflict of laws. The references to
conflict of laws were included in the comment to "wave a flag
[and] signal a problem."' 8 " Unfortunately, however, the commitfaintest idea
tee that drafted the Model Rules did not "have 18the
5
of what it means" or how it should be applied.
The comment to rule 8.5 provides as follows:
If the rules of professional conduct in the two jurisdictions differ, principles of conflict of laws may apply. Similar problems
can arise when a lawyer is licensed to practice in more than
one jurisdiction.
Where the lawyer is licensed to practice law in two jurisapplicable rules
dictions which impose conflicting obligations,
186
of choice of law may govern the situation.
a. A Literal Reading of Model Rule 8.5
In interpreting the comment to rule 8.5, it is not at all clear
when "principles of conflict of laws may apply."' 8 7 The reference
in the second sentence to "similar problems" with regard to a
lawyer admitted in more than one jurisdiction clearly indicates
that the first sentence applies to a lawyer admitted in only one
jurisdiction. On its face, the first sentence suggests that whenever a lawyer acts outside of his jurisdiction, he must take into
consideration another state's ethical code. One of the few discussions of this comment concurs with such a literal reading:
The express statement in [the comment to] Rule 8.5 that the
rules of choice of law and the conflict of laws may govern the
situation means that the one-jurisdictional estate planner's
conduct will also be tested against the ethical codes and unlawful practice rules of foreign jurisdictions touched by his client's estate plan, if choice of law rules bring then [sic] into
operation. "'
If enforced, however, such an interpretation would heavily burden the practice of law. A lawyer practicing largely in one jurisdiction would have to educate himself in the ethical obligations
184 Telephone interview with Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, Reporter to the ABA
Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (Apr. 4, 1985). The main reason Model Rule 8.5 was included in the new rules was that foreign countries, especially France, wanted it made clear that United States lawyers practicing abroad
would still be subject to discipline by the states in which they were licensed. Id.

185 Id.
186 MODEL RULES,

supra note 15, Rule 8.5 comment.

Id.
188 Hendrickson, Ethical Concerns in Multi-jurisdictional Est. Planning, 123 TR. &
EST., Nov. 1984, at 31, 35.
187
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imposed by states in which he has not been licensed. He would have
to keep in mind all of the possible jurisdictions where his activities
might have consequences or whose laws he might be interpreting. 18 The complexity of these activities and the potential exposure
to disciplinary action for violations of standards of which the attorney was unaware would make the practice of law much more inefficient and expensive. A limited application of this portion of the
comment is thus desirable.
b. Limitation to UnauthorizedPractice
If the Model Rules are designed to govern those engaged in
the practice of law,'
then someone must be considered to be
practicing law in order for the Model Rules to apply. Because
"[t]he definition of the practice of law is established by law and
varies from one jurisdiction to another,"' 9' a conflict might arise
concerning the characterization of a lawyer's conduct. A one-jurisdictional lawyer working in a foreign state might be violating
the rule prohibiting unauthorized practice if what he was doing is
considered to be practicing law in that state. 1 9 2 In determining
whether the lawyer is engaged in the practice of law, choice-oflaw principles suggest that the law of the foreign jurisdiction
should govern this decision.19 3 If the lawyer was engaged in unauthorized practice violative of rule 5.5, the lawyer should thus
be disciplined in his home state in accordance with the foreign
state's definition of the practice of law-even though, according
189 If, in a disciplinary action, an attorney is held to the standards of another state
with which he has only tangential contact, due process problems of notice may
arise. The Supreme Court has held that a state may not deprive a person of the
right to practice law without affording him due process. See, e.g., In re Ruffalo, 390
U.S. 544, 550-52 (1968); Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278, 282 (1957).
190 See DRAFr RULES, supra note 25, chairman's introductory note ("The Model

Rules are first and foremost intended to serve as a national model of the regulatory
law . . . governing the practice of law.").
191 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 5.5 comment; see also Rhode, supra note

170, at 45. Some jurisdictions prohibit unauthorized practice without defining the
practice of law. Id. at 145 n.135. Others define it as what lawyers do. Id. at 145
n. 136. For example, the Model Code states that "the practice of law relates to the
rendition of services for others that call for the professional judgment of a lawyer."
MODEL CODE, supra note 8, EC 3-5. Some states provide lists of legal activities, but
these are usually only illustrative and contain more nebulous terms such as "legal
advice." See Rhode, supra note 170, at 46 & nn.140-44.
192 See MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 5.5(a).
193 Applying an interest-analysis theory, the state where the lawyer acted in violation of Model Rule 5.5 would have a greater interest than the state where the lawyer
was admitted.
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to his home state's definition, he was not practicing law and
therefore not subject to the Model Rules.
It is difficult to foresee how such an interpretation will work
in practice, however. First, the licensing state has no incentive,
except a weak interest in reciprocity, to regulate its lawyers' unauthorized practice of law in other states. It also lacks the resources necessary to acquire information about its lawyers'
activities in other states. Thus, it is unlikely that the home state
will ever discipline a lawyer for violating Model Rule 5.5 if sanctions have not first been imposed on the lawyer by the foreign
jurisdiction.
Second, enforcement of prohibitions against unauthorized
practice varies greatly from state to state. 194 Consequently, the
presumption that an attorney is not practicing law in the foreign
state if he is not charged by the foreign state with unauthorized
practice will be difficult to rebut in the home state.
Furthermore, the limitation of the first sentence of the comment to unauthorized-practice situations does not exhaust the
implications of its general call for the application of conflict-oflaws principles when ethical codes differ.' 95 Therefore, something else must be governed by the first sentence.
c.

Limitation to Special Admissions

Under another interpretation, application of the first sentence could be limited to situations in which the lawyer is specially admitted to a second state. The second sentence refers
only to "similar problems

. . .

when a lawyer is licensed to practice

in more than one jurisdiction."' 196 Because an attorney specially
admitted pro hac vice or otherwise is not licensed in the second
jurisdiction, the second sentence does not refer to him. This
leaves the first sentence.
When a lawyer is admitted for a particular proceeding, he
agrees to obey the ethical standards of the second state. 97 If
there is a conflict between the rules of his licensing state and
those of the specially admitting state-both of which have jurisdiction as well as significant interests in overseeing his conductSee Rhode, supra note 170, at 15-33. In seven states, there are "neither unauthorized practice committees nor other state agencies active in unauthorized practice enforcement." Id. at 14.
195 See Hendrickson, supra note 188, at 35 (stating conflicts principles applicable
to unauthorized-practice laws as well as ethical obligations).
196 MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 8.5 comment (emphasis added).
197 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
194
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conflict-of-laws principles will have to be applied. By going beyond a mere literal reading, such an interpretation is a reasonable way of giving life to the comment.
d.

Limitation to International Situations

An alternative construction of the first sentence focuses on
the reason for including rule 8.5 in the new code. 8 In most foreign countries, the practice of law is "much more narrowly defined than in the United States."' 99 It is often limited to
litigation, arbitration, and other "case-like" matters. 20 0 Thus, a
United States lawyer engaging in other types of legal work
abroad may not be subject to the prohibitions on unauthorized
practice or to the foreign ethical codes. The comment could thus
be viewed as indicating that the Model Rules would govern the
lawyer's conduct when no foreign law applies because the lawyer's foreign activity would be considered the practice of law in
the licensing state. In the presence of a foreign regulation, however, conflict of laws principles may apply.
The literal-interpretation and special-admission readings of
the first sentence seem the best. The limitation to international
situations has no basis in the words of the statute, and the unauthorized-practice construction creates too many problems. If unauthorized-practice laws are significantly relaxed, however, a
foreign attorney may be allowed to become substantially involved
in activities in a state where he is not licensed. The broadening
of the scope of some states' disciplinary jurisdiction indicates that
this is already happening. Conflict-of-laws principles applicable
to a lawyer admitted in more than one jurisdiction should apply
in such situations.20 ' With regard to the single-jurisdiction practitioner, conflict-of-laws principles should be applied only to special admissions.
B.

Lawyer Admitted Pro Hac Vice

The lawyer admitted pro hac vice is subject to the jurisdiction of the state where he has been specially admitted,20 2 as well
as to the jurisdiction of the states that have licensed him. 2 0 3 It
198 See supra note 184.
199 Hendrickson, Ethical Considerations in International Estate Planning, in
LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ESTATE PLANNING 7 (1981).

CURRENT

200

Id.

201

See infra notes 207-266 and accompanying text (discussing conflict of laws).
See supra notes 162-167 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118-124 and accompanying text.

202

203
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seems logical that if the ethical standards of the states having jurisdiction conflict, the lawyer should be bound by the standards
of the specially admitting state in matters relating to the particular proceeding for which he has been admitted. The commentary
to ABA Standard 4.2, regarding lawyers specially admitted to
practice in a state, concludes that "misconduct should in the first
instance be judged by the ethical standards of the jurisdiction
where it occurred.

' 20 4

The passage assumes that misconduct in

connection with a pro hac vice admission takes place, or should
be considered to take place, in the specially admitting state. The
specially admitting state is thus viewed as having a more significant interest in conduct related to the special admission, and thus
its code should be applied. Furthermore, the attorney admitted
pro hac vice usually consents to the jurisdiction of the admitting
state. 20 5 Given the general rule that a court with jurisdiction will
apply its own ethical standards, the attorney will know beforehand that his consent causes the foreign state's standards to be
applicable to his conduct in connection with the special
admission.
One question that the application of the admitting state's
standards will raise is what activities are sufficiently related to the
special admission to be covered by the foreign state's rules. Depending on the contents of the conflicting provisions at issue, a
lawyer may try to limit the activities governed by the pro hac vice
admission to trial work or, in the alternative, to expand the coverage to any matter connected to the court appearance, no matter how distant. A uniform rule defining what acts are
significantly related to the specially admitting state would be an
important development. At this time, however, it is sufficient to
state the general rule that acts related to the pro hac vice admission should be governed by the specially admitting state's code.
A second problem arises concerning the lawyer's relationship with his client. Because his ethical obligations may be altered when he represents the client pro hac vice in another state,
the lawyer must explain the situation so that his client can choose
204 ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 4.2 commentary. The reference to "in the
first instance" appears to imply that upon consideration by the licensing state, the
misconduct may be judged by the standards of that state. This is consistent with
Model Rule for Disciplinary Enforcement 21(D)(4), which suggests that substantially different discipline may be warranted in the home state. See MODEL RULES FOR
DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123, Rule 21 (D)(4).
205 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
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another lawyer if necessary.2 °6 For example, client confidences
may be tightly protected in the state where the lawyer is licensed
and regularly represents the client. In another state where the
client is sued or wishes to bring suit, the ethical standards may
require the lawyer to reveal client confidences in many more situations than in the licensing state. This situation may impinge on
the client's interest in employing counsel of his choice and force
him to take the time, effort, and expense to establish a relationship with a new lawyer, to whom he will not reveal all his confidences and secrets.
C. Lawyer Licensed in Two Jurisdictions
The comment to Model Rule 8.5 states that "[w]here the
lawyer is licensed to practice law in two jurisdictions which impose conflicting obligations, applicable rules of choice of law may
govern the situation. "207 It contains no hint as to what the "applicable" choice-of-law rules are. 20 8 How this rule will be applied is
thus very uncertain. 20 9 A first step toward answering this question requires examination of how conflicts in ethical codes are
handled today.
1. Current Handling of Conflicting Standards
When "disciplining their attorneys," bar counsel currently
apply their states' rules exclusively. 210 The bar counsel have not
yet dealt with the problem of conflicting obligations 2 1 -proba bly because it has not yet arisen. In general, disciplinary agencies
expect that their states' ethical rules will be obeyed when a lawyer
206 See MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 1.4(b) ("A lawyer shall explain a matter
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions
regarding the representation.").
207 Id. Rule 8.5 comment.
208 Telephone interview with Professor Geoffrey C. Hazard, supra note 184. Professor Hazard indicated that conflicts of ethical codes and choice of law were
viewed as a "peripheral problem" when the Model Rules were drafted. Id.
209 Id. Professor Hazard stated that a person would have to be "out of [his] mind
to say what will be applied" and that "choice of law is in chaos." Id. Another commentator stated in reference to rule 8.5 that "this is an area which will have to be
developed on a case by case basis until some norms can be identified. It is unquestionably an area in which additional rules are needed." Benasutti, The New ABA
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 54 PA. B.A.Q. 239, 256 (1983).
210 Telephone interview with Robert Wells, supra note 180.
211 Id.; Telephone interview with David Johnson, Director of the New Jersey Office of Attorney Ethics (Apr. 9, 1985); Telephone interview with Alice Flanagan,
Administrative Liaison to the New York Committee on Professional Ethics (Apr. 9,
1985).

708

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 16:678

in multistate practice is practicing law in their state. 2 12 It is not

clear, however, what contacts with the state are sufficient to constitute "practicing law in the state."
In the 1941 case of In re Porep,213 California authorities declined to discipline a lawyer for advertising in a California newspaper.21 4 The Nevada Supreme Court, however, despite the
propriety and legality of the attorney's action under California
standards, found that by Nevada standards, he had engaged in
professional misconduct.2 5 The court failed to consider whether
one state or another had a stronger interest in the attorney's actions. It determined instead that each state should apply its own
standards to the attorney's conduct, 21 6 presumably because each
had an interest in it.
In a more recent opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that because New Jersey lawyers could not advertise on television, neither could they advertise in print their association with
multijurisdictional law firms whose television advertising reached
New Jersey consumers.21 7 Even though the multistate law firm in
question had been in compliance with the laws of the states
where the television advertisements originated, the court reasoned that its associates in New Jersey would violate their own
professional standards by taking advantage of the advertising.21 8
Thus, a small contact in the home state-such as reception of
out-of-state television broadcasts-may be enough to cause the
home state to expect its rules to be followed.
Other states have considered the contacts necessary to justify regulation of an attorney's out-of-state conduct. For example, in a 1981 informal ethics opinion, the Michigan Bar ruled on
the case of a lawyer licensed in Michigan and California-states
that had differing ethical codes-who was practicing in California. 2 19 Although his conduct 'technically violated the Michigan
code, the opinion concluded that the attorney would not be sub212 Telephone interview with David Johnson, supra note 211; Telephone interview with Alice Flanagan, supra note 211; Telephone interview with Melvin
Herschman, supra note 180.
213 60 Nev. 393, 111 P.2d 533 (1941); see supra text accompanying notes 128-130.
214 Porep, 60 Nev. at 396-97, 111 P.2d at 535.
215 Id. at 400-01, 111 P.2d at 537.
216 See id. at 396-97, 111 P.2d at 535.
217 In re Professional Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 475, 89 N.J. 74, 88-89, 444
A.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (1982).
218 See id. at 89, 444 A.2d at 1099-1100.
219 Comm. on Professional andJudicial Ethics of the State Bar of Mich., Informal
Op. CI-709, at 1 (Dec. 28, 1981). Michigan's rules were more stringent than California's. Id.
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ject to discipline in Michigan if he conformed with the California
standards. 2 2' The bar committee stated that the Michigan ethics
code "assumes some relationship or contact between the lawyer's
activities and the State of Michigan beyond the single fact of the
lawyer's membership in the State Bar of Michigan." '2 2 ' Nonetheless, it refused to establish a test for "[e]xactly what that relationship or contact must be to render [the] Code applicable. '2 2 2 The
bar committee did list some relevant contacts, however, the absence of which led it to say that Michigan's rules should not apply
to this case.2 2 3 Those contacts included (1) having Michigan clients, (2) practicing in Michigan, (3) holding himself out as a
Michigan lawyer (e.g., advising as to the law of Michigan),
(4) practicing under or by virtue of a Michigan license, and
(5) having a practice with significant connection or relationship
to Michigan.2 2 4
While this list of contacts may or may not be helpful, the case
itself is so extreme on its facts that the result is not surprising.
Michigan has no interest in someone practicing exclusively in
California. Unless someone in Michigan received information
about the attorney's California practice, Michigan would never
2 25
have considered disciplining him.
In 1985, the Committee on Ethics of the Maryland State Bar
Association considered the case of an attorney who was a member of both the Maryland and District of Columbia bars and who
was representing a client in the District of Columbia.2 2 6 The case
presented the question of which jurisdiction's ethical code governed the attorney's conduct. 227 The attorney knew that his client
had created fraudulent material that had been introduced into
evidence in the District of Columbia proceedings. 2 28 The District
of Columbia Code provided that the lawyer should *call on his
client to rectify the fraud, while the stricter Maryland Code required the lawyer to reveal the fraud to the court if the client did
not rectify it. 2 2 9 Although this case involved one jurisdiction with
a more restrictive standard than another, the Maryland Bar rec220

Id. at 3.

221

Id.

222
223
224
225
226
227
228
229

Id.
See id. at 1, 3.
Id.
See supra notes 125-161 and accompanying text.
Comm. on Ethics of Md. State Bar Ass'n, Final Op. 86-28, at 1 (Oct. 7, 1985).
Id. at 1-2.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 2.
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ognized that "it is.. .conceivable that one jurisdiction could pass
a rule requiring the attorneys subject to its control to act in a
manner contrary to that which is required by another jurisdiction. '2 30 Both ethical standards in the case were based on the
Model Code, which lacks any provision regarding conflicting obligations. The ethics committee therefore referred to Model Rule
8.5 and the accompanying comment. 2 3 ' The committee also relied on the Michigan ethics opinion discussed earlier to conclude
that
[t]he practice of law frequently requires lawyers to act in more
than one jurisdiction. Obviously, each jurisdiction has the authority to determine what ethical conduct is required of its attorneys and what conduct is proscribed. Where a Maryland
attorney is acting in a foreign jurisdiction in accordance with
that jurisdiction's Code of Professional Responsibility, it is the
opinion of this Committee that his conduct is ethical per se.
While the Maryland Code of Professional Responsibility may
impose different or more stringent requirements on its attorneys, it does not require its attorneys to behave in a manner
that is inconsistent or at variance with the code of conduct pre2 32
scribed by another jurisdiction when practicing law there.
The Maryland decision must have been keyed to a determination that because he was appearing before a court in the District of
Columbia, the lawyer in question was "practicing law" there. If the
Maryland committee considered the attorney to be practicing law
only in the District of Columbia, its decision that he had to conform
his conduct only to the District of Columbia standards was logical.
These cases reveal that in states operating under the Model
Code, lawyers licensed in more than one state and subject to differing ethical standards must have some contact beyond merely being
licensed in the enforcing state for that state to apply its rules. The
lawyer must be "practicing law in the state. "233 This may involve
having clients in the state, advising on the state's law, having an office in the state, or appearing in court in the state.2 3" Such a list of
contacts is reminiscent of the nebulous lists of activities some states
employ in their unauthorized-practice statutes.2 3 5
230
231
232

Id.

See id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.

233 Telephone interview with David Johnson, supra note 211; Telephone interview with Alice Flanagan, supra note 211; Telephone interview with Melvin
Herschman, supra note 180.
234 See supra text accompanying notes 223-224.
235 See supra note 191.
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If the lawyer meets the requirements of "practicing law in the
state"-whether under the unauthorized-practice or some other
test-the state expects its rules to be followed.23 6 States do not take
into account the possibility that another state, with a different ethical agenda, may consider the same activities to be the practice of law'
and therefore subject to their code. In fact, the lawyer is expected
to obey both sets of standards.2 3 7
While it may be possible to comply with both state standardsfor example, if one is simply more stringent than another, 23 8 or if
one is mandatory and the other permissive 2 39 -there are some directly conflicting obligations even among states operating under the
Model Code.2 4 ° Eventually, some lawyer will be forced to obey one
state's ethical provision in obvious violation of another state's. The
state whose code has been violated could ignore the fact that the
lawyer was involved in practice in both states and stubbornly discipline the attorney for violating its rules. On the other hand, it could
apply choice-of-law principles, as one would hope the lawyer had
done when he made his decision about which standard to obey-and
as the Model Rules suggest.
2.

Choice of Law Under the Model Rules

a. Analogy to Current Choice-of-Law Standards
If we assume that, by whatever definitions the states employ,
a lawyer licensed in two states is engaged in the practice of law in
both states, that each state has a different ethical code, and that,
in the absence of another interested state, each state would apply
its own ethical rules, it is necessary to apply choice-of-law rules to
resolve the conflict. Because there is no precedent in this area of
236 See, e.g., Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the State Bar of Mich.,
Informal Op. CI-709 (Dec. 28, 198 1); see also supra notes 181 & 212 and accompanying text.
237 Telephone interview with Alice Flanagan, supra note 211. Ms. Flanagan stated
that a lawyer broadcasting an advertisement received in two states where he practices should conform to both standards. Id. In reference to advertising standards,
the Legal Ethics Committee of the Oregon Bar stated that an interstate law firm
"would have to establish ... rules that utilized the strictest ethical restrictions in
any of the states in which the firm practiced." Oregon Legal Ethics Comm., Op.
492, at 537 (Sept. 1983).
238 Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 7.2(b) (requiring advertisements to
be kept on file for two years) with ARIZ. R. Sup. CT. 42, ER 7.2(b) (requiring advertisements to be kept on file for three years).
239

Compare MODEL

CODE,

supra note 8, DR 4-101(C) (permitting disclosure of

client confidences) with VA. R. Sup. CT. DR 4-101(D) (requiring disclosure under
certain circumstances).
240 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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conflict of laws, analogies must be drawn to other conflict rules.
Malpractice cases provide a source of analogous choice-of-law
principles because misconduct by a lawyer may not only be
grounds for disciplinary action, but also the subject of a malpractice suit.
The first problem with analogizing to legal malpractice, however, is that it may be brought as either a tort action or a contract
action.' 4 ' Misconduct leading to a suit in tort under one state's
law might be the basis for an action in contract according to another state's law.2 42 Moreover, the question of which state's law
governs may turn on whether the action is in tort or contract.2 4 3
Strict reference to choice of law in legal malpractice could thus
lead to enormous complexity. As a first step in minimizing confusion, conflicts principles could be used to determine whether a
malpractice action lies in contract or tort. The following example
illustrates the problem:
Example 1. Lawyer L is admitted and practicing in states A and
B. A and B prescribe different ethical obligations.
(a) If L follows A's rule, B institutes disciplinary proceedings. In determining what rule L should have obeyed, B analogizes to malpractice law. It determines that under the law of
B, such a malpractice action would be in tort. Under B's conflict rules governing tort actions, its standards should apply.
b) If L follows B's rule, A begins disciplinary action.
When referring to malpractice cases, A finds that L's conduct
241 See, e.g., Valerio v. Boise Cascade Corp., 80 F.R.D. 626, 632 (N.D. Cal. 1978),
af'd, 645 F.2d 699 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1126 (1981); Floro
v. Lawton, 187 Cal. App. 2d 657, 672-73, 10 Cal. Rptr. 98, 107 (1960).
242 Compare Sitton v. Clements, 385 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1967) with Yazzie v. Olney,
Levy, Kaplan & Tenner, 593 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1979). In Sitton, the court held that
under Tennessee law, an action by a client against his attorney for negligently failing to institute a suit within the statute of limitations was a contract action. Sitton,
385 F.2d at 870. In contrast, the Yazzie court found that the same sort of misconduct, under Arizona law, did not give rise to a contract action, but to a tort action.
See Yazzie, 593 F.2d at 105.
243 See, e.g., Hood v. McConemy, 53 F.R.D. 435, 443 n.10 (D. Del. 1971). In
Hood, residents of Pennsylvania hired a Pennsylvania attorney to represent them in
a malpractice suit against a Delaware physician. Id. at 438. Much of the lawyer's
performance took place in Delaware, although some of his mishandling of the case
occurred in Pennsylvania. See id. at 438-39. The action was filed and dismissed in
Delaware. Id. at 443. The Federal district judge, applying the conflicts rules of
Delaware, determined that if the action were on the contract, Pennsylvania law
would govern because that was where the contract was made. Id. at 443 n. 10. If the
action were in tort, however, Delaware law might govern if it was determined to be
the place of the tort. Id. The court left both questions-the location of the tort and
whether the action was in contract or tort-unresolved because their determination
became unnecessary. Id. at 443.
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would lead to a contract action under the law of A. Pursuant
to A's conflict rules governing contract actions, A's standards
should apply.
The characterization of a malpractice claim as an action in tort
or contract should likewise be determined according to conflicts
rules, or in some other uniform manner. Even if states A and B both
view the misconduct as a basis for the same type of malpractice action, the choice-of-law rules may differ in each state, thereby producing contrasting results. The following example illustrates this
problem:
Example 2. Lawyer L is admitted and practicing in states A
and B. A and B prescribe different ethical obligations. Under a
hypothetical uniform rule adopted by both A and B, L's conduct would be viewed as the subject of a contract action.
(a) L follows A 's ethical rule and B begins disciplinary
proceedings. B finds that its choice-of-law rules for contracts
call for B's standards to be applied because B is the place
where the contract was made.
(b) L follows B's ethical rule and A starts the disciplinary
process. Under A's choice-of-law rules for contracts, A's standards should be applied because the contract was centered
there.
If states look to the choice-of-law rules applied in legal malpractice cases in order to create corresponding rules for attorney ethics,
it will be very difficult to produce consistent and predictable results.
Therefore, a uniform choice-of-law rule for attorney ethics should
be drafted.2 44
244 Another possible source of analogous conflict-of-laws principles is the choiceof-laws standard applied when Federal regulation of attorney conduct conflicts with
state professional responsibility standards. Various Federal agencies regulate attorneys practicing before them. For example, in 1981, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) held that an attorney violates professional standards under the
SEC rules if he fails to take action to end his corporate clients' noncompliance with
the disclosure requirements of the securities law. See In re Carter, [1981 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981). The Internal Revenue
Service proposed a similar rule in 1980. See Amendments to Circular 230, 45 Fed.
Reg. 58,594, 58,595-97 (1980) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 10). Furthermore,
Congress has expressly authorized such regulation of attorneys. See, e.g., 31 U.S.C.
§ 330 (1982) (Department of Treasury); 35 U.S.C. §§ 31, 32 (1982) (Patent and
Trademark Office); 43 U.S.C. § 1464 (1982) (Department of Interior). The courts
have recognized that state regulation must yield "to the limited extent necessary for
the accomplishment of the federal objectives." Sperry v. Florida ex rel. Fla. Bar, 373
U.S. 379, 402 (1963) (footnote omitted); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609
F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1979) (SEC has ability to regulate attorneys who practice before
it).
Given the Federal legislative and judicial precedent, this area will not be a
fruitful source of analogous conflict-of-laws rules for interstate questions. Federal
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A New, Uniform Choice-of-Law Standard

Conflicting ethical codes will cause attorneys in multistate
practice concern; conflicting rules on which state's ethical code is
applicable will create utter confusion. As one commentator
notes, "People repeatedly subjected. . . to two or more inconsistent sets of directions, without means of resolving the inconsistencies, [will] not fail in the end to react as [Pavlov's] dogs did.
The society, collectively, [will] suffer a nervous breakdown. ' 245
A uniformly applicable choice-of-law rule would not require
analogy to the malpractice laws of individual states. Factors to be
considered under a uniform rule would draw on both tort and
contract conflicts standards. Such considerations would include
the following:
(a) the place where any injury resulting from the misconduct
occurred,246
(b) the place where the misconduct causing the injury
occurred,247

(c) the place where the lawyer entered into a contract with any
248
affected client,
(d) the place where any such contract was negotiated,2 49
(e) the place of performance of the lawyer's services,2 5 °
(f)
the location of any property that is the subject of the law251
yer's representation,
(g) the domicile, residence, place of business and place of in2 52
corporation of the lawyer and any affected parties,
law will be controlling in this area. As one author notes, "Where federal and state
standards conflict, the proper response is . . .to apply federal standards where
they may constitutionally be applied and state standards elsewhere." Cox, supra
note 121, at 213.
Thus, choice of law in Federal-state conflicts is governed by the rules of the
forum in which the attorney is acting. This is similar to the choice-of-law doctrine
in colonial America and, at the same time, in England. At that time, choice of law
was identified with choice of court. Nelson, The American Revolution and the Emergence
of Modern Doctrines of Federalism and Conflict of Laws, in LAw IN COLONIAL MASSACHUsETrs: 1630-1800, at 419, 426-27 (D. Coquillette ed. 1984). Each type of court
applied its "own peculiar brand of law." Id. at 426. The only determination to be
made was which court had jurisdiction. Id. at 428-29.
245 Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 489
(1954).
246 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145(2)(a) (1971).
247 Id. § 145(2)(b).
248 Id. § 188(2)(a).
249 Id. § 188(2)(b).
250 See id. §§ 188(2)(c), 196.
251 Id. § 188(2)(d).
252 See id. §§ 145(2)(c), 188(2)(e).
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(h) the place where the lawyer's relationship with the affected
parties is centered,253 and
(i) the interests of the state.254
Enactment of a uniform rule containing the guidelines listed
above would ease the application of Model Rule 8.5.
i. Where It Should Not Be Applied
Although this proposed rule might effectively deal with some
interstate ethical problems, there are certain types of conduct to
which it should not be applied. Rules dealing with the lawyer's
relationship to the legal profession, for example, are not likely to
be conflicting. They may be different in two states-one may be
permissive and the other mandatory-but they will not require
contradictory types of conduct. For instance, state A may require
pro bono service while state B only suggests it, or A may prohibit
laudatory advertising while B permits it. It is highly unlikely,
however, that B will prohibit pro bono work when A requires it,
or that A will require laudatory advertising when B prohibits it.
Therefore, a lawyer will be able to conform to both states' standards in these areas.
Nevertheless, each state has a strong interest in maintaining
its own regulations in such areas. If lawyer L is permitted to engage in laudatory advertising that reaches state A-where such
advertising is prohibited-because he is primarily engaged in
practice in state B-where such advertising is allowed-he will
gain a significant business advantage over his fellow lawyers in
state A.255 Thus, any advertisements published or broadcast in
state B must satisfy B's ethical code. If those advertisements
reach consumers in state A as well, however, they must meet the
requirements of both states A and B. The burden is therefore on
the advertising attorney to know how many states his advertisement will reach and what is required by the ethical codes in those
states.
The rule described above should be confined to the few situations in which the states in question have equal interests in the
lawyer's conduct and in which it is possible for the lawyer to satisfy both sets of rules. So long as states maintain differing rules
Id. § 145(2)(d).
Id. § 6(2)(b), (c).
255 See In re Professional Ethics Advisory Comm. Op. 475, 89 N.J. 74, 89, 444
A.2d 1092, 1099-1100 (1982).
253
254
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on advertising and solicitation, this standard will be necessary. 256
This rule of maximum compliance should not carry over to
other areas where the interests of each state may differ in intensity, however.257 It will be much easier, in most situations, for a
lawyer to determine in which state his activities are centered and
which state thus has the stronger interest in having its law applied. It will be more difficult for the lawyer to decide whether he
has satisfied a second state's threshold-of-interest test and
whether he should follow the second state's code at the same
time. The lawyer would have to obey the stricter of the two standards in order to obey both. Therefore, if it has a stricter standard, the state with the minimal interest in the lawyer's conduct
would end up controlling the lawyer's behavior because he could
not risk complying only with the permissive rules of the other
state.
ii.

Court Appearances

The ability of the courts to discipline lawyers stems from the
courts' inherent power to control their officers.258 Given this
traditional basis for the power to regulate the ethics of attorneys,
conflicts involving practice before a state court should be resolved in favor of the disciplinary standards in force in that
state.2 59 Such a rule, however, will be subject to the same problem as pro hac vice appearances 26 0-- defining what activities are
sufficiently related to the court appearance to be governed by the
rule. Model Rules 3.1 through 3.7 and Model Rule 8.3 will nonetheless be enforced according to the version enacted by the state
where the court is located because they are closely related to appearances before courts. The problem with using this rule in
other areas is illustrated in the following example:
Example 3. Lawyer L regularly represents client C in state
A. L is admitted in state A and state B. C is being prosecuted
256

text.

For a discussion of national standards, see infra note 274 and accompanying

257 But see Cox, supra note 121, at 211. Cox states that "an attorney may choose
the stricter standard to insure avoidance of disciplinary action. This approach assumes that an attorney knows he is subject to both standards." Id. It may indeed be
advisable to comply with two states' rules whenever possible if choice-of-law rules
fail to yield a definite answer.
258 See Exparte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1882); In re Echeles, 430 F.2d 347 (7th Cir.
1970); In re Rhodes, 370 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1967).
259 See Comm. on Ethics of Md. State Bar Ass'n, Final Op. 86-28, at 3-4 (Oct. 7,
1985).
260 See supra notes 162-173 and accompanying text.
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for fraud in state B. In the course of preparing for the trial, L
learns that C is engaged in a separate fraud involving serious
financial harm to people in state D. Rule 1.6 in state A requires that this information be kept confidential, while rule 1.6
in state B mandates disclosure (assume that state D is not sufficiently interested to have its rule considered). Which provision governs L's conduct?
While most of his contact with C has been in state A, the information was uncovered in connection with preparation for a trial in
state B. Nonetheless it seems that L's contacts with state A are
stronger with regard to this information. L and C presumably have
offices in state A, legal services were expected to be and were usually
rendered there, and L and C began their relationship there. The
data with regard to the other fraud does not have any impact on the
court appearance in state B, as would, for example, a fraud on the
state B court 26 1 or a continuance of the activity that led to the prosecution in state B. 2 62 Consequently, rule 1.6 of state A should control. Thus, while the presence of a court appearance invokes a clear
rule, the scope of the rule must be carefully defined and limited. By
making application of the rule certain in the cases so defined, such
limitations may be beneficial. 2 63
iii.

Clients v. Outside Parties

Example 4. Lawyer L is admitted in states A and B. He has
offices in cities on opposite banks of the river separating the
states. Client C has its main offices in state A. L has been representing C in similar business deals in both states. A majority
of the parties with whom C is dealing are located in state B.
Some transactions have been closed. Some are still being negotiated. In the course of his representation of C, L discovers
that C is defrauding the other parties. The ethical code of state
A requires that L keep this information confidential. The professional responsibility rules of state B oblige L to inform the
affected parties of the fraud. What should L do?
If L maintains his silence, he may be disciplined in state B. If he
reveals the information, he is subject to sanctions in state A. Assuming that L's services have been rendered equally in states A and B,
the problem boils down to weighing the interests of the affected parties in L's conduct against the interests of the client. Neither set of
See MODEL RULES, supra note 15, Rule 3.3(a)(2).
See id. Rule 3.3(a)(1), (2), (4).
A lawyer should reveal to his client any new ethical obligations that could
affect his representation of the client in litigation in a foreign court. See supra note
206 and accompanying text.
261
262
263
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interests necessarily outweighs the other. Choice-of-law rules
should emphasize the location of the client more than the location
of the affected parties. The client became involved with the lawyer
before the other parties were introduced to the situation. If the client had any expectation of what laws would govern the lawyer's
dealings with him, it would probably have been those of state A.
Moreover, a lawyer is often thought of as owing his primary duty to
his client.2 6 4
This is not necessarily the result that must be reached, but a
rule must be established. The weighing of the interests discussed
above is a policy decision. This decision should not be left to the
states, however, if uniform choice-of-law rules are expected. The
state that opted for disclosure has already indicated that it places
greater emphasis on the interests of victimized third persons than
the state that enacted the strict confidentiality standard. Thus, state
B is likely to weigh third parties' interests more heavily in its choiceof-law rule, and state A is likely to favor the client's location in its
choice-of-law standard. Consequently, if left on their own to arrive
at conflict of laws guidelines, the states might adopt different standards-and thus fail to resolve the lawyer's conflict. A uniform rule
based on the location of the client does not make an ethical choice
because it does not know what the ethical rule will be in the state of
the client. 2 65 It sets up a neutral mechanism for choosing among the
ethical choices the states have each made. 26 6 It is a tool that will
enable the lawyer to know what is expected of him.
The specifics of a uniform choice-of-law rule have yet to be
hammered out. This article has indicated some of the principles the
author believes it should contain-the interest of the state in continuous application of rules relating to the legal profession, the interest
of the courts, and, all other things being equal, the location of the
client over the location of the affected parties.
Most importantly, the choice-of-law rules should be uniform
264

See

MODEl. RULES,

supra note 15, preamble. In the Model Rules, the first re-

sponsibility of a lawyer listed is representation of clients. See id. Rules 1.1-1.16.
265 Of course, a state that has decided to protect victims may not favor such a
choice-of-law rule because an out-of-state client with an out-of-state lawyer might
circumvent the rule. It is probably just as likely, however, that lawyers and clients
from that state may be taking advantage of people in other states.
266 In contrast, a choice-of-law standard that dictated the selection of the state
standard most favorable to one type of party (e.g., the client), rather than the selection of the rule of the state where the client is located, would make an ethical
choice. As a consequence, it would never be uniformly adopted. States that had
promulgated rules weighing the location of the affected parties more heavily would
not adopt this choice-of-law standard because their rules would never be chosen.
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throughout the states. While some states may balk at certain specific provisions, uniformity should be the main concern. Otherwise,
conflicting ethical obligations may be left unresolved by conflicting
choice-of-law rules. Although a choice-of-law standard may cause
the lawyer to be removed from some representations, diverse
choice-of-law rules could lead to a lawyer's not engaging in any multistate representations where ethical obligations conflict. Such a
system would be inefficient as well as unfair to honest clients who
would not wish to involve the lawyer in troublesome situations.
V.

A.

SOME ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS AND

DiscusSION

Defining Unauthorized Practice

For several reasons, it would be worthwhile to have "a uniform definition of the practice of law as it applies to lawyers rendering legal services in an interstate context."2 6' 7 First, lawyers in
multijurisdictional practice would know what activities they could
268
engage in without risking criminal and disciplinary penalties.
Second, assuming the definition would recognize that a lawyer
sometimes needs to engage in at least incidental activities across
state lines, a lawyer licensed in only one jurisdiction could be
obliged to follow the ethical obligations of another state if he
were engaged in substantial activities there. 26 9 The presumption
that the lawyer was either engaged in unauthorized practice in
the other state and therefore in violation of rule 5.5, or not engaged in practice in the other state and thus not subject to the
foreign state's ethical code would no longer be necessary.2 7 0 The
same choice-of-law rules that would apply to lawyers licensed in
more than one state would apply to the lawyer licensed in only
one state but occasionally acting in other states.
B.

Model Rule for Disciplinary Enforcement 21(D)(4)

Rule 21(D)(4) provides that in reciprocal disciplinary proceedings, identical discipline need not be imposed if "[t]he misconduct established [by the record of the foreign proceedings]
warrants substantially different discipline in this state. '2 71 This
267 E. MICHELMAN, supra note 162, at 14.

268 See supra notes 170-174 and accompanying text.
269 See PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 140, at 68 (suggesting court

rule "that any attorney who regularly engages in the practice of law within a jurisdiction . . . thereby submits himself to the disciplinary jurisdiction of that court
regardless of where he may be formally admitted").
270 See supra text accompanying notes 188-195.
271 MODEL RULES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123, Rule 21 (D)(4).
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provision is included in the disciplinary rules of many of the
states.272
27
An exception that allows less punishment to be imposed 1
because the states have different ethical codes does not belong in
a reciprocal discipline statute. This is true now and should be
even clearer when choice-of-law rules are created. If a lawyer has
violated a standard of professional responsibility in another state,
the home state will be acting in a very provincial and shortsighted manner if it excuses the violation because it does not apply the same rule. Professional misconduct is a serious matter; it
demonstrates a lawyer's lack of respect for the legal system. If
the home state wants lawyers admitted in other states to respect
its rules, it should not allow a lawyer who has violated other
states' rules to go unpunished. Once choice-of-law guidelines
are established, the need for eliminating this exception will be
stronger-each state will regularly be applying the standards of
another state. Reciprocal enforcement of another state's standards, even if they conflict with the home state's, is and will be a
central factor in maintaining out-of-state lawyers' respect for foreign states' ethical codes.
C.

Uniformity of Ethical Codes/National Bar Regulation

If a uniform ethical code were imposed on all lawyers in all
jurisdictions, a new area of conflicts law would not have to be
developed. Avoiding a choice-of-law problem is, by itself, an insufficient reason to make the drastic reforms in the regulation of
the legal system that would allow the imposition of a national
ethical code.2 7 4 Nevertheless, a uniform ethical code is appealing
272

See, e.g.,

ALA. RULES OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT

17(d)(3); ARIZ. R. Sup.

CT. 58(c)(4); IOWA RULES GOVERNING ADMISSION TO THE BAR 118.17; Ky. R. Sup.
CT. 3.435.

The provision also allows greater sanctions to be levied. See supra note 151.
In 1983, Senator Arlen Specter, a Republican from Pennsylvania, proposed
the Lawyer's Duty of Disclosure Act of 1983. See S. 485, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1983). The proposed act would have amended the Federal mail fraud statute to
provide that an attorney could be fined up to $5000 or imprisoned for up to one
year if he used the mails for the delivery of documents that could enable a client to
commit a criminal or fraudulent act and if he did not disclose his discovery of his
client's intent to commit or commission of a criminal or fraudulent act to Federal
law enforcement authorities. Id. The proposed statute was criticized as impinging
on fifth amendment due process rights, the sixth amendment right to counsel, and
self-regulation of the legal profession. Cady, Attorney Disclosure: The Model Rules in
the Corporate/SecuritiesArea, 12 COLO. LAw. 1975, 1978 (1983).
A less drastic reform that has been proposed is Federal Trade Commission
regulation, rather than state ethical control, of advertising and solicitation. But see
273
274
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for other reasons. A lawyer in interstate practice would not have
to investigate the ethical obligations of each state where he engages in practice and would not have to calculate which state's
standards would apply to each of his actions under the choice-oflaw rules. In addition, there might be less public criticism of the
profession 275
Diversity in the professional responsibility rules does have
some appeal, however. It can lead to greater debate over and
more careful examination of controversial issues.2 76 Moreover,
the different policy choices can be "field tested" in "different
laboratories.277
VI.

CONCLUSION

The promulgation of conflicting standards of ethical obligations will create problems for the increasing number of lawyers in
multistate practice. They will have to educate themselves in the
codes of professional responsibility in all the states where they
are licensed or otherwise engaged in practice. Furthermore, they
will have to decide which jurisdictions' rules to obey at which
times.
Currently, there are no guidelines for deciding which standards to follow. If each state interpreted the choice-of-law comment to Model Rule 8.5 differently and set up varying rules for
selecting the applicable ethical standard, the confusion would be
multiplied many times. Therefore, the problem should not be
approached on the state level. The choice-of-law comment to
Model Rule 8.5 should be studied further and a uniform method
for resolving conflicts among ethical codes should be established
nationally-perhaps as an amendment to the ABA Standardsand enacted by the states.
Podgers, FTC Attacked in the First Round of Congressional Oversight Hearings, 7 B.
LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1981, at 7, 7-8 (criticizing FTC regulation).
275 See generally Manson, Preserving the Client's Confidences-The Lawyer's Dilemma, 10
VA. B.A.J., Summer 1984, at 5, 6. ("Although diversity may be beneficial under

some circumstances, here it can only result in public criticism of the legal profession. With such important interests at stake, surely the legal profession should continue to strive for a uniform, coherent resolution of these issues.").
276 See Reaves, Ethics Domino, 70 A.B.A.J., Jan. 1984, at 33, 33; Winter, supra note
13, at 4.
277 Winter, supra note 13, at 4 (quoting Michael Franck, executive director of the
State Bar of Michigan).

